

Analyzing the Ransomware Attack on D.C. Metropolitan Police Department by Babuk

Emily Caroscio, Jack Paul, John Murray, and Suman Bhunia

Department of Computer Science and Software Engineering, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, USA 45056

Email: caroscen@miamioh.edu, pauljr2@miamioh.edu, murra101@miamioh.edu, bhunias@miamioh.edu

Abstract—Ransomware attacks are a fast-growing cybercrime that pose a large threat to society. These attacks can result in losing significant amounts of data and money for their victims. This paper examines the 2021 Babuk attack on the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department. It provides an in-depth analysis of the methodology of the attack and examines the impact at a local and global level. This attack was allegedly committed by a foreign-based hacker group known as Babuk. A total of 250 gigabytes of data were stolen from the victim. Babuk first had to gain access by infiltrating the system to attack the victim successfully; however, there is no clear evidence on how this was specifically done. Babuk likely gained access by scanning for vulnerable ports in the victim’s system, sending employees a phishing email with a malicious link, or cracking passwords that the victim used for admins in their system. After gaining access, Babuk had to maintain access while stealing and encrypting files. Finally, they demanded ransom from the victim and threatened to post the sensitive data if the ransom was not paid. The attack has impacted not only the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department but also the lives of individual police officers and other public security officials. The paper surveys the possible defense strategies against such ransomware attacks from foreign national hackers. The defense strategies may include changing government policies, regulating cryptocurrency, and adhering to FBI-listed advice.

Index Terms—Ransomware, Police, Babuk, Cybercrime, Data Breach, Cybersecurity

I. INTRODUCTION

On April 26th, 2021, the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (DCMPD) confirmed they were subject to a massive ransomware attack. The DCMPD is one of the largest and most important police departments in the United States. Not only do officers of this department attempt to reduce and control crime in the greater D.C. area, but also undertake missions such as improving overall neighborhood safety, emphasizing homeland security in their operations, and creating a culture of transparency and accountability for all [1]. However, just because the DCMPD plays such a crucial role in keeping the citizens of Washington, D.C. safe does not mean that their cybersecurity practices are foolproof. The attackers were allegedly a foreign-based group named Babuk. In 2021, Babuk was also allegedly responsible for attacks on at least five other major organizations [2].

Cybercriminals across the globe can attack vulnerable organizations with great ease using malicious software. By doing so, criminals impact the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of sensitive data that businesses and governments use




Figure 1: A schema of Babuk’s attack on the DCMPD

in their day-to-day operations. One of the most common forms of malicious software is known as ransomware. Ransomware can be used to steal and encrypt data from a victim, essentially holding it “hostage” until the victim pays the attacker for it to be decrypted [3]. Most ransomware programs operate by using some form of asymmetric cryptography to encrypt data in ciphertext. When asymmetric cryptography is used, a public key and a private key are created that can be simultaneously used to decrypt the ciphertext. Without both keys, it is virtually impossible to decrypt ciphertext. Ransomware groups typically threaten their victims into paying for the private key in bitcoin, thus completing their malign intentions [3].

When an organization becomes victim to a ransomware attack, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) requests they contact the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) immediately. The CISA and FBI say paying the ransom may enable cybercriminals to continue attacking, and in some cases paying the ransom is illegal [4]. Another reason they insist to not pay the ransom is because the attacker may not end up giving the decryption key anyway.

As shown in Figure 1, Babuk’s ransomware strategy takes

on a similar structure to many other ransomware groups. After targeting the DCMPD, the group used their ransomware to infiltrate the DCMPD’s systems. Once they had gained access, the group was able obtain and encrypt 250 gigabytes of sensitive information regarding the department and their operations in the greater D.C. metro area. After encryption, the group forced the police department to reach out to them in order to regain control over the data. In this instance, they requested \$4 million dollars from the DCMPD in exchange for the private key, or else the sensitive information would be posted on their forum. The police department countered the offer by saying they would pay \$100,000, which was not enough for Babuk [5]. All 250 gigabytes of data were posted online on May 13th, 2021 [2].

This paper highlights the importance of the consequences that ransomware attacks can have on affected victims. Experts believe that the DCMPD attack is the largest cyberattack to ever be perpetrated on a U.S. police department [5]. Data stolen during the attack was comprised of sensitive documents pertaining to hundreds of individuals regardless of their affiliation with the DCMPD. This attack shows that ransomware is becoming a major concern for not only businesses but also government agencies and entities as well, and represents overarching troubles that ransomware will continue to cause until permanent defense solutions can be implemented. This paper will focus not only on organizational changes that can be made to prevent specific Babuk ransomware attacks but also broad changes that can be made to prevent ransomware as a whole.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we will discuss the backgrounds of the victim, the DCMPD, and the attacker, Babuk. Information regarding Babuk’s attack patterns and habits will also be reviewed. In the following section, we will explain the details of how the D.C. Metropolitan Police ransomware attack was carried out. This includes considerations of how access was gained, how access was maintained, and details of how the ransom was demanded by Babuk. After this, the overall impact of the DCMPD attack is elaborated. This will include both specific consequences that the DCMPD dealt with as well as broader impacts that ransomware attacks have in the U.S. Finally, we will explain the possible countermeasures that can be taken against ransomware attacks such as this.

II. VICTIM AND THE ATTACKER

As previously stated and outlined in Fig. 2, DCMPD first notified the press of the attack in late April 2021. In this section, we study the background of DCMPD and the ransomware group.

A. D.C. Metropolitan Police Department Data

The DCMPD is easily one of the most prominent police departments in the U.S. The department is one of the largest in the nation, and serves greater metropolitan area of the District of Columbia [1]. The department also attempts to increase the safety and transparency of their operations to




Figure 2: Timeline of Babuk’s attack on the DCMPD

make residents feel more at ease. Because the department is located in the capital of the United States of America, they carry out work more important than a typical police department. In fact, officers from the DCMPD were called in to help control the crowd at the U.S. Capitol during President Joe Biden’s inauguration on January 6th, 2021 [6]. The heightened responsibility that the DCMPD handles on a daily basis is one of the many reasons why they are such an important police department in the U.S.

In their normal operations, police departments typically deal with various types of data. This includes criminal history records, law enforcement incident reports, records of judicial actions and decisions, and watch lists of known and suspected terrorists [7]. Not only does this data help law enforcement and government agencies detect and prevent crime before it occurs, but it also allows them to share data with different policing agencies. Police departments also store information relevant to their officers, including personal and employment data, as well as important information about their general operations.

These copious amounts of data make police departments more vulnerable than ever to cyberattacks. This was the case for the DCMPD when they were targeted by Babuk [5], [8], [9]. During the attack, massive amounts of extremely sensitive information about officers of the DCMPD. Hundreds of disciplinary files about officers and intelligence reports involving the FBI and Secret Service were leaked onto Babuk’s forums.

B. Babuk Hacker Group

Not much is known about the alleged attackers, who are known as Babuk. The foreign-based group thinks of themselves as “*security auditors*” who request payments from the companies they “*provide their services*” to [2]. On their forums, Babuk tells victims that they would be much worse off if their data were in more villainous possession. In other purported attacks, Babuk operated using a “*ransomware-as-a-service*” model. That being said, it is believed the group have become more focused on data extortion after the DCMPD attack. As seen in the timeline (Figure 2), Babuk was first detected in early 2021. Babuk’s ransomware uses similar operating methods compared to many other ransomware groups, and a technical analysis of their ransomware found it shared

About Us

What is BABUK?

Non malicious, specialized software, created with purpose to show the security issues inside the corporate networks.

Babuk uses strong symmetric encryption combined with ECDH, that's mean that data impossible to recovery without our private key.

In our understanding - we are some kind of a cyberpunks, we randomly test corporate networks security and in case of penetration, we ask money, and publish the information about threats and vulnerabilities we found, in our blog if company doesn't want to pay.

For example, imagine the situation: villians intruding the building company's network (huge developer who specializes on sport objects), those villians doesn't care about money, they are crazy fanatics from terroristic organization, they get the blueprints and schematics... just think what going to be furter..

Our audit is not the worst thing can happen to your company, but think twice, pay by money, of maybe the people lives...

Figure 3: Babuk forum post (in English) describing their background and intentions which can be only accessed through the TOR web browser [2].

extreme similarities to another type of ransomware named Vasa Locker [10].

Figure 3 displays a post from the group's data leak site describing their intentions. While this may seem ironic considering Babuk does force victims into negotiation to decrypt their data, the group does have several "whitelisted" organizations. These organizations include hospitals, non-profit organizations, schools, or companies with an average revenue of less than \$4 million USD [10].

The group uses a series of English-speaking and Russian-speaking forums for operations [2]. The English-speaking forums are used primarily for leaking certain amounts of victim data and for communicating messages to the general public, while the Russian-speaking forums are used for communication between members and advertising recruitment to the group.

C. Babuk's Ransomware Attacks Strategies

The group uses their ransomware to meticulously attack enterprises in the *transportation, healthcare, plastic, electronics, and agricultural* industries. Before the attack on the DCMPD, Babuk had already used their ransomware to target at least five victims in these sectors in the first half of 2021 [10]. The group has been successful in at least one of these attacks, as one company paid them \$85,000 to decrypt data stolen by Babuk's ransomware.

Babuk's attacks also varied in geography, with major attacks occurring in the United States, Spain, Italy, India, and China [10]. According to cybersecurity experts, their continued success is a result of operating out of jurisdictions which provide




Figure 4: Ransomware attack phases that Babuk typically uses on their victims, including the DCMPD [13].

them protection from international law. This is due to ineptitude or indifference from countries that they operate out of. [8]. Additionally, when Babuk threatens victims that sensitive information will be posted online, they request payment in Bitcoin in order to recover the data. Because the sending and receiving of Bitcoin is not overseen by one government or organization, this makes it much easier for Babuk to avoid international authorities [11].

One specific instance of Babuk's ransomware attacks occurred to the Houston Rockets, a professional basketball club in the NBA. Babuk used ransomware to steal and encrypt 500 gigabytes of the organization's data [12]. The data stolen were all important documents to the organization and included third-party contracts as well as corporate, customer, employee and financial information. This information was highly sensitive and was not meant to be seen by the general public. For example, one leaked document, titled "Team Sale", led many to speculate whether the team's owner was looking into selling the team or not. This attack bore many similarities to the attack against the DCMPD, which would occur only weeks after the Houston Rockets attack was reported.

III. D.C. METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT RANSOMWARE ATTACK

In every cybercrime there is a set of phases used by the attackers in order to successfully infiltrate and attack a system. Malicious software, often referred to as "malware" is software purposefully designed to cause harm to computers and/or users in order to gain access to sensitive information. When cybercriminals use malware, there are a variety of different techniques that can be used to attack a victim. One common attack technique is a form of malware called ransomware [3], [14]. The specific attack that the Babuk group used was the ransomware-as-a-service model. Figure 4 shows the three main phases of a Babuk Ransomware attack. All of the following information is based off of three main technical analyses of source code from this Babuk attack and prior ones. Two of the analyses were done by McAfee [10], [13] and the other by Chuong Dong on his security blog [15].

The source code used throughout different Babuk attacks had evolved into different mutexes and the ones discussed in this paper are shown in Table I. The rest of this section discusses possible points of gaining access, what happened

Table I: Babuk Ransomware Versions

Version	Source	Details
Version 1 (v1)	[10], [15]	This version analyzed was the first version of the ransomware detected.
'DoYouWantToHaveSexWithCuong-Dong' version	[2]	This version is believed to be used in the DCMPPD attack and talks about the new updates to the encryption.
April 2021 Version (babuk_v2)	[13]	This version was analyzed from a version from April 2021 and talks about some changes from the original version.

when access ultimately was gained, and how ransom was demanded from the victim.

A. Gain Access

The first phase for this attack was to gain initial access into the DCMPPD's system. To successfully have done this the attackers first had to complete reconnaissance. This means they attempt to find as much information they can about the DCMPPD, including what types of software's they use. Babuk then needed to scan the system for vulnerabilities to see where they could enter the system. There are three possibilities for how Babuk gained this initial access to the DCMPPD's system.

The information about how access was actually gained was not released by the police department. The first possible way would have been to exploit a vulnerability that may have been found during *scanning and enumeration* [13]. There are tools to do this and Babuk had done it before by exploiting a public-facing application, in the specific case the application had been Microsoft. Another possibility to gain access to the system would be via phishing email. If Babuk sent a fake email with a malicious link or attachment and that was clicked on or downloaded, they could get initial access. Phishing emails are sometimes hard to spot because they can be made to look very legitimate. The last possibility is that Babuk found a vulnerable password and could gain remote access into the system by guessing this password [13].

Babuk's ransomware is programmed in an open source language called Golang. In a McAfee technical analysis, it is mentioned that Golang written on a Linux system can run on either Windows or Mac [13].

B. Maintain Access

Figure 5 shows the life-cycle of the malware after Babuk has successfully gained access into the DCMPPD system. They terminate databases, office applications, and anti-malware services in order to further avoid detection [2]. Examples of the main services Babuk will terminate include:

`sql.exe`, `firefox.exe`, `outlook.exe`, `onenote.exe`, `powerpnt.exe`. Examples of the main anti-malware services stopped include: `GxVss`, `GxBldr`, `GxFWD`, `DefWatch` [2]. They began to move laterally through the system. Babuk uses command line operations which allows for flexibility. It executes many shell function calls (Table II) to covertly propagate their access. The functions used to terminate the services if




Figure 5: Attack Methodology Breakdown, specifically how they maintained access after compromising DCMPPD system [15]

found are `QueryServiceStatusEx`, `OpenServiceA`, `EnumDependentServicesA`, `CloseServiceHandle` and `GetLastError`. The functions used to terminate processes if found are `CreateToolhelp32Snapshot`, `lstricmpw`, `OpenProcess`, `TerminateProcess` and `CloseHandle`. The ransomware runs commands and destroys the "shadow volumes" of the victim machine which covers the tracks of the commands being ran [10]. The function used is `ShellExecuteW`, which deletes these shadow copies. Then the command `SHEmptyRecycleBinA` is used to empty the recycle bin of the victims machine to prevent any possibility to regain and recover data [16]. This ensures that the victim needs the decryption key from the attacker in order to have the files back.

The next action performed is file encryption. In Version 1 of the malware the files are enumerated up to 16 folders deep. This means if there was a 17th nested folder it would be ignored [10]. The malware traverses and encrypts files using recursive methods. The functions run are `FindFirstFileW` and `FindNextFileW` which go through the directories on the victim's system [15]. Babuk then uses the HC-128 algorithm for file encryption with the Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) scheme for file key encryption. The specific elliptic curve used for cryptography was `Curve25519` [2]. According to a technical analysis done on Version 1, Babuk had used the `ChaCha8` algorithm with the keys generated from `Curve25519` and `SHA-256` [13]. When the files are encrypted, the extension `.babyk` is appended to all files using the functions `SetFileAttributesW`, `lstrlenW`, `lstrcpyW`, `lstrcatW`, and `MoveFileExW` [16]. These files are impossible to decrypt without the private key, so without that the files may be lost forever. While encrypting files, Babuk leaves off certain files and folders like "Windows" and "Firefox" in order to prevent the victim's machine from crashing. The mutex version of the source code believed to be used for the DCMPPD attack has the name "DoYouWantToHaveSexWith-

Table II: Shell functions used by Babuk ransomware for lateral propagation after gaining access to the DCMPD network [15], [16]

Shell Function	Description
ShellExecuteW	Executes <code>cmd.exe /c vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet</code> to delete shadow volumes
SHEmptyRecycleBinA	Empties the recycle bin of victim's machine
FindFirstFileW FindNextFileW	Recursively uses these method calls to traverse through directories and subdirectories of a system
SetFileAttributesW lstrlenW lstrcpyW lstrcatW MoveFileExW	Functions used to append the <code>.babyk</code> extension to encrypted files.
QueryServiceStatusEx OpenServiceA EnumDependentServicesA CloseServiceHandle GetLastError	Functions used to terminate certain services (mostly anti-virus scanners) to avoid alerts
CreateToolhelp32Snapshot lstrcmpW OpenProcess TerminateProcess CloseHandle	Functions used to terminate certain processes (mostly database and office-applications) to prepare files for encryption

CuongDong.” This refers to researcher Chuong Dong who analyzed Version 1 of the Babuk malware. After he posted his technical analysis, Babuk made changes to the code to create other mutex versions [2].

C. Demand Ransom

After the Babuk ransomware had infiltrated the system, the last step was to demand ransom from the DCMPD. They left a file titled “How to Restore Your Files.txt” with a ransom note on the system that has contact information and proof that the files have been taken [2]. In this instance, the department did not find out their systems had been compromised until it was posted on the Babuk forum. The instructions to contact the attacker are listed and state to download the Onion Router from a dark-web repository¹, then open it and follow a link in the browser². Babuk changes these links for each specific attack. The note also provided a link to where the information will be leaked to the public on the Dark Web [2].

IV. IMPACT

As previously stated, Babuk had claimed to have stolen in total 250 gigabytes of data from the DCMPD [9]. The data stolen was compromised of both sensitive information on individuals as well as larger federal documents. More specifically, sensitive documents pertaining to individual police officers were leaked to the public. Social security numbers, marriage history, financial details, criminal history, employment history, answers to polygraph tests, and social media activity of officers

¹<https://www.torproject.org/download/>

²<http://babukq4e2p4wu4iq.onion/login.php?>




Figure 6: Organizations and areas who are impacted by the attack

were all included in the leak. Documents leaked concerning the DCMPD included psychiatric evaluations, details of past drug use, finances, backgrounds checks, sexual abuse, disciplinary actions, and other confidential documents.

A. Impact on DCMPD and Public

As shown in Figure 6, data leaks released by Babuk on the DCMPD had a very damaging impact on the officers involved as well as the department itself. After the data was leaked, D.C. Police Union chairman Gregg Pemberton stated, “How we will ever hire anyone to work here is beyond me” [5]. Ransomware expert and threat analyst Brett Callow explained that because of the risks that officers and civilians faced from these leaks, it is “possibly the most significant ransomware incident to date” [5].

The impact of these leaks has also had dire legal implications for the victim. D.C. Police Union filed a grievance for a collective bargaining agreement violation against the city [5]. This violation of the collective bargaining agreement had been a direct result of the information leaks and the union requested an investigation by the city’s inspector general.

However, the documents leaked did not only affect individual officers from both the Washington, DCMPD and other agencies; unfortunately, sensitive federal documents were also leaked. These documents include highly sensitive security information related to US presidential inauguration as well as detailed steps of an FBI investigation, which listed suspects and general data pulled from cell towers to aid in the investigation [5], [8], [17]. Copies of these documents being freely available online endangered many more people outside of the DCMPD. Since many individuals have had their private information released to the public along with documents that could threaten public security, the attitudes regarding cybersecurity in the DCMPD have shifted.

B. Broad Impact of Ransomware

Babuk’s attack on the Washington DCMPD was only a single attack that represents a larger and growing problem. The impact of ransomware attacks has grown massively in the past few years. In October 2021, the number of publicly

Table III: Rate of Enforcement of Crimes (where enforcement is frequency of an enforcement action being taken by authorities for a given crime) [20], [21]

Crime	Rate of Enforcement
Cyber Crime	<1%
Violent Crime	46%
Murder and Non-negligent Manslaughter	61%
Rape	33%
Robbery	31%
Aggravated Assault	52%
Property Crime	17%
Burglary	14%
Larceny-theft	18%
Motor Vehicle Theft	14%
Arson	24%

reported data breaches had already surpassed the total number of data breaches from 2020 [18]. A cybersecurity firm named Cybersecurity Ventures estimates that costs associated with damage from ransomware will amount to \$265 billion dollars by 2031 [19]. Cybersecurity Ventures also believes that by 2031, novel ransomware attacks will be attempted every 2 seconds against businesses, consumers, and individual devices.

However, ransomware is not the only form of cybercrime that is increasing. Mobile devices being attacked with malware have increased 54% across the globe, and software update supply chain attacks having implanted malware on software packages have increased by 200% between 2016 and 2017. The costs of these attacks are growing to tremendous amounts as well. It is estimated that financial costs incurred by entities hacking US companies, most of whom are foreign-based, are between \$225 billion to \$600 billion annually [20].

One reason why ransomware and other cybercrimes have able to increase so greatly is due to low enforcement rates for cybercrimes. Table III shows the rate of enforcement of cybercrime compared to other forms of crime in the U.S. It is incredibly difficult for federal authorities such as the FBI and NSA to track down and charge cybercriminals with criminal charges for their actions. This low enforcement rate when compared to other crimes makes cybercrime a “low-risk, high-reward” option for criminals who have the know-how to carry out these types of attacks.

V. POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURES

Figure 7 outlines several key areas that could act as possible defense strategies against ransomware attacks. When it comes to cybersecurity, several government agencies such as the FBI and CISA offer general tips on how an organization can protect itself. These tips include using strong passwords, ensuring that an organization is using the most current versions of software, conducting regular virus scans, backing up data consistently, and making members aware of phishing scams [14].

A. Continuous Penetration Testing of System

Frequent penetration testing of a system should be carried out to discover the attack surface and vulnerabilities in systems. More specifically, McAfee offers suggestions on how to




Figure 7: Defence Solutions of Babuk Attack

Table IV: Penetration Tools and Hacking Frameworks [10]

Penetration Test-ing Tools/Hacking Frameworks	Description
winPEAS	Used for privilege escalation on Window hosts.
SharpHoud	Collects data from domain joined Windows systems as well as domain controllers.
CobaltStrike	A software which emulates threats for penetration testing.
Metasploit	An open source penetration testing framework that is used to improve security.
Covenant	A control framework and a .NET command that detects attacks.

defend against Babuk themselves [10]. McAfee states that defenders should look out for behaviors with correlation to open source penetration testing tools or hacking frameworks such as winPEAS, SharpHoud, CobaltStrike, Metasploit, or Covenant because Babuk has posted that they recruit individuals with penetration testing skills [10]. Table IV outlines how each out these tools are normally used for ethical hackers to legally test organizations for vulnerabilities.

B. Organizational Policies

Another method of defence against cyberattacks such as this is changing government policies. As illustrated in Table III, there is a large enforcement gap when dealing with cybercrimes. One suggestion is to build better cyber defences but also increase effort into pursuing human attackers. It argues that this strategy could both decrease the finite amount of hackers nation wide, discourage others from pursuing cybercrime, and makes sense given the estimated \$225 billion to \$600 billion annual cost to US companies in 2017 [20]. However, despite the tremendous cost caused to the US economy by cybercrime the Department of Defense had only spent \$7.2 billion broadly on cybersecurity in the same year [20]. Though there have been some recent policy changes, such as a recent Executive Order from US President on cybersecurity that requires companies to report specific information about data breaches and establishes the Cybersecurity Safety Review Board, there are still many more defence methods that can be put into place [22].

C. Cryptocurrency Regulation

Cryptocurrency is widely used in ransomware attacks. This is due to that fact that cryptocurrency is easy to use and hard to trace when dealing with amounts of money. The regulation of cryptocurrencies both nationally and internationally could aim in investigations of cybercrime. Specifically, one study found that regulating Bitcoin globally that is done clearly, consistently, and cost effectively could help target malicious Bitcoin users [23]. Increasing global regulations for Bitcoin exchanges can help increase transparency between senders and receivers, especially malicious ones. Because Bitcoin uses blockchain for operations, none of its transactions are truly anonymous. Bitcoin exchanges use identifying documents to accurately trace the sender and receiver of the exchange [11]. These documents contain “know-your-customer” IDs, which can be used by law enforcement or government agencies to help track malicious Bitcoin traders and bring them to the justice system.

D. Community Awareness for Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks

Phishing is one of the most common ways that malicious actors are able to gain access to a system in a ransomware attack. Nearly one quarter of ransomware victims report that phishing was how attackers initially penetrated their system, and of those victims, over one half had conducted anti-phishing training in their organization to some degree [24]. Teaching employees about what phishing is and how to detect it within their system is a crucial step to preventing large-scale ransomware attacks in an organization. Microsoft lists calls to action or threats, poor spelling and grammar, unexpected links and/or attachments, and mismatched email domains as common hallmarks of phishing messages [25]. If an employee receives a phishing email, they should never open any links or download any attachments from the email. Reporting and deleting the email is the easiest way to prevent it from propagating ransomware onto a company’s network. Keeping an organization’s members knowledgeable about their security policies and practices is a major defense against ransomware attacks.

It is important to stay up to date on emerging cybercrime trends. Many attacks target software that is out-of-date or needs newer security patches. If the current trends are being researched this will help to keep any company’s cybersecurity up to par and be one step ahead of the hacker groups. This especially matters when software being used is old or out dated. Police computers are vulnerable for this exact reason, as they have older software with vulnerabilities that are typically targeted by ransomware groups [26].

VI. CONCLUSION

Babuk’s attack on the DCMPD should serve as an example that no organization should take the ever-present threat of ransomware lightly. This pivotal attack showed that even one of the nation’s most important and active police departments is still vulnerable to attack. The 250 gigabytes of data encrypted

could have resulted in much more damage to not only the police department but also the United States federal government. Babuk’s strategy of data encryption during the ransomware attack also shows how important it is for organizations to better protect their data before it is stolen. Babuk likely could have made far more important information available on the dark web had the DCMPD been less resistant to their ransomware process. It is important for organizations to re-evaluate their ransomware prevention strategies and be wary of the constantly evolving threats that ransomware groups pose to their data. Only through constant and effective prevention strategies can the DCMPD discourage hacker activities and prevent data breaches like the one Babuk perpetrated against them. Using strategies such as increasing awareness of phishing attacks, updating or patching legacy software, and following the latest government regulations are all safe and effective ways that organizations like the DCMPD can use to increase their ransomware awareness. Research areas for future ransomware prevention include malware mutex detection and safer decryption methods for DCHD encryption and other similar encryption techniques. Additionally, research into global regulation of bitcoin transactions is another strategy to help deter cybercriminals using ransomware to profit off of vulnerable businesses.

REFERENCES

- [1] “MPDC: Mission and Value Statement.” <https://mpdc.dc.gov/page/mpdc-mission-and-value-statement>, 2021.
- [2] “Threat analysis: Babuk ransomware.” <https://www.acronis.com/en-us/articles/babuk-ransomware/>, 2021.
- [3] A. Tandon and A. Nayyar, *A Comprehensive Survey on Ransomware Attack: A Growing Havoc Cyberthreat: Proceedings of ICDMAI 2018, Volume 2*, pp. 403–420. 01 2019.
- [4] “Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments.” https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/ofac_ransomware_advisory_10012020_1.pdf, 2020.
- [5] A. Suderman, “DC police victim of massive data leak by ransomware gang.” <https://apnews.com/article/police-technology-government-and-politics-1aedfcf42a8dc2b004ef610d0b57edb9>, 2021.
- [6] M. Austerhuhle, “D.C. Metro Police Describe Being First Responders To Insurrection At The Capitol.” <https://www.npr.org/2021/01/16/957695863/dc-metro-police-describe-being-first-responders-to-insurrection-at-the-capitol>, 2021.
- [7] “LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION SHARING.” <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/who-we-are/organizations/ise/ise-archive/ise-additional-resources/2142-law-enforcement-information-sharing>.
- [8] J. Diaz, “D.C. Police Department Victim Of Apparent Ransomware Attack.” <https://www.npr.org/2021/04/27/991116344/d-c-police-department-victim-of-apparent-ransomware-attack>, 2021.
- [9] T. Brewster, “Ransomware Hackers Claim To Leak 250GB Of Washington, D.C., Police Data After Cops Don’t Pay 4 Million Ransom.” <https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2021/05/13/ransomware-hackers-claim-to-leak-250gb-of-washington-dc-police-data-after-cops-dont-pay-4-million-ransom/?sh=60b3b3b058d0>, 2021.
- [10] A. Mundo, T. Seret, T. Rocca, and J. Fokker, “Technical Analysis of Babuk Ransomware.” <https://www.mcafee.com/enterprise/en-us/assets/reports/tp-babuk-ransomware.pdf>, 2021.
- [11] M. Prathap, “Bitcoin does not make payments anonymous — just really hard to trace.” <https://www.businessinsider.in/investment/news/bitcoin-does-not-make-payments-anonymous-just-really-hard-to-trace/articleshow/85068905.cms>, 2021.
- [12] R. R. Doug Olenick, “Houston rockets investigate ransomware attack.” <https://www.databreachtoday.asia/houston-rockets-investigate-ransomware-attack-a-16415>, 2021.

- [13] N. Thibault Seret, Noël Keijzer, “Babuk : Moving to VM and * nix Systems Before Stepping Away.” <https://www.mcafee.com/enterprise/en-us/assets/reports/rp-babuk-moving-to-vm-nix-systems.pdf>, 2021.
- [14] “Ransomware 101.” <https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-101>, 2020.
- [15] C. Dong, “Babuk Ransomware.” <https://chuongdong.com/reverse%20engineering/2021/01/03/BabukRansomware/>, 01 2021.
- [16] S. Tripathi, “Babuk Ransomware.” <https://www.subexsecure.com/pdf/malware-reports/2021-04/babuk-ransomware.pdf>, 2021.
- [17] P. H. Dalton Bennett, “Hackers post hundreds of pages of purported internal D.C. police documents.” https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/dc-police-hackers-ransomware-babuk/2021/05/13/d0280fb4-b3f7-11eb-a980-a60af976ed44_story.html, 2021.
- [18] C. Brooks, “MORE Alarming Cybersecurity Stats For 2021!.” [https://www.forbes.com/sites/chuckbrooks/2021/10/24/more-alarming-cybersecurity-stats-for-2021-/,](https://www.forbes.com/sites/chuckbrooks/2021/10/24/more-alarming-cybersecurity-stats-for-2021-/) 2021.
- [19] D. Braue, “Global Ransomware Damage Costs Predicted To Exceed \$265 Billion By 2031.” <https://cybersecurityventures.com/global-ransomware-damage-costs-predicted-to-reach-250-billion-usd-by-2031/>, 2021.
- [20] M. Eoyang, A. Peters, I. Mehta, and B. Gaskew, “To Catch a Hacker: Toward a comprehensive strategy to identify, pursue, and punish malicious cyber actors.” <https://www.thirdway.org/report/to-catch-a-hacker-toward-a-comprehensive-strategy-to-identify-pursue-and-punish-malicious-cyber-actors>, 2018.
- [21] “Crime in the U.S. 2019.” <https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2019/crime-in-the-u.s.-2019>, 2020.
- [22] F. Ordonez, “In Wake Of Pipeline Hack, Biden Signs Executive Order On Cybersecurity.” <https://www.npr.org/2021/05/12/996355601/in-wake-of-pipeline-hack-biden-signs-executive-order-on-cybersecurity>, 2021.
- [23] C. D. Angela S.M. Irwin, “Following the cyber money trail: Global challenges when investigating ransomware attacks and how regulation can help.” <https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/JMLC-08-2017-0041/full/html>, 2019.
- [24] “Phishing continues to be one of the easiest paths for ransomware.” <https://www.zdnet.com/article/phishing-continues-to-be-one-of-the-easiest-paths-for-ransomware-report/>, 2021.
- [25] “Protect yourself from phishing.” <https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/protect-yourself-from-phishing-0c7ea947-ba98-3bd9-7184-430e1f860a44>, 2021.
- [26] “Insurance Lessons from the Cyber Attack at DC’s Police Department.” <https://terraclaim.com/blog/cyber-security-lessons-from-the-attack-on-dc-police>, 06 2021.